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Given myriad business practices and conditions, establishing
certain antitrust harms requires context. This context often
comes from framing the effects of the challenged conduct against
the backdrop of some relevant market. In particular, a challenged
practice's anticompetitive impact may be outsized in a smaller
market but insignificant in a larger one. For instance, the impact
of a merger of two firms might be major if their combination cap-
tures 80 percent of a smaller market but relatively minor if that
same combination represents only 10 percent of a larger market.
In the latter, the combination is a drop in the bucket, while in the
former it is a tidal wave. Plaintiffs thus have incentives to plead
narrower relevant markets while defendants prefer broader ones.
Yet this process of defining the relevant market can be highly
technical, thrusting on judges the task of reining in increasingly
complex economic and statistical analyses.
Challenging as this may be, the Supreme Court may face a
taller task this term in Ohio v American Express Co., In partic-
ular, recent recognition of business methods known as "multi-
sided platforms" further muddies the water by introducing addi-
tional complexity during market definition.2 These business
methods connect two or more distinct groups of consumers that
would benefit from interacting but face barriers to doing so. For
example, payment-card platforms connect cardholders and mer-
chants by issuing cards on one side of the platform and providing
t JD/PhD (Economics) Candidate, The University of Chicago. The author wishes to
thank Professor Randal Picker as well as Mila Rusafova, Emily Samra, and the members
of The University of Chicago Law Review for their helpful thoughts and suggestions.
1 2017 WL 2444673 (US). For the decision below, see United States v American
Express, 838 F3d 179, 188-89 (2d Cir 2016) ("Amex").
2 See text accompanying note 83 (defining a platform as a business method that
enables interactions between distinct groups, each of which cares about the extent of the
other group's participation).
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card-processing services on the other.3 Video game platforms con-
nect gamers with developers by selling game consoles on one side
of the platform and development kits and licenses on the other.4
Newspapers similarly connect subscribers and marketers by sell-
ing news content on one side of the platform and advertising space
on the other.5 In this manner, selling more to one group influences
demand by the other group. 6 Often, the way platforms attract
suitable participation is by offering discounts to the harder-to-
attract group at the expense of the more ready-and-willing group.
For instance, payment-card users frequently receive rewards-a
sort of negative price-to ensure their participation.7 These are
funded through fees assessed to merchants that desire cardholder
business.8
To the technical process of market definition, multisided plat-
forms thus add the challenge of determining whether the relevant
market should incorporate all, some, or none of these
interconnected groups. Because certain forms of antitrust
analysis allow courts to trade off pro- and anticompetitive effects
within the relevant market, defining that market serves to estab-
lish the space of permissible trade-offs.9 Notably, defining the rel-
evant market to include all sides of the platform creates a broader
space of allowable trade-offs than when the definition encom-
passes fewer sides. This is one reason that winning at market def-
inition often means winning the case. Thus, it matters crucially
whether and how courts incorporate "multisidedness" during
market definition. This Comment suggests an approach to that
inquiry.
Part I explores the challenges inherent in market definition.
It situates this definitional process within the framework of the
major antitrust enforcement laws to clarify the judicial require-
ments for defining a relevant market. It then frames market def-
inition as both central and contested, pausing to chronicle
Supreme Court jurisprudence designed to structure the inquiry
3 See text accompanying notes 85-89.
4 See Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J Econ Persp 125,
125, 129-31 (Summer 2009) (asserting that both video game systems and payment cards
are examples of multisided platforms).
5 See E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms, 100 Am Econ Rev 1642,
1642-43 (2010) (describing credit cards and newspapers as canonical examples of multi-
sided platforms).
6 See notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
7 See Rysman, 23 J Econ Persp at 129 (cited in note 4).
8 See notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
9 See notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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and mitigate likely pitfalls. Part II explores the added challenge
of whether the relevant market should incorporate all, some, or
no sides of the platform. It describes the economic concept of a
multisided platform and details the different ways that lower
courts have addressed this challenge. Because plaintiffs and de-
fendants often have opposing incentives concerning the number
of sides that should be incorporated, knowing when to disregard
or accept arguments concerning multisidedness is important. In
this context, the courts could benefit from a test that seeks to de-
termine when the relevant market should incorporate all sides
of the platform. Hence, Part III proposes a two-stage test for
multisidedness.
In the first stage, a court would ask (1) whether the business
method can explicitly charge different prices to the distinct
groups to which it provides goods or services; (2) whether each
group's benefit depends on the extent of participation by the other
groups provisioned by the same business method and whether
that participation varies based on market conditions; and
(3) whether the platform is capable of, and generally does, set uni-
form prices in the markets in which each group participates. All
three factors must hold, or multisidedness should be excluded
from market definition.
Assuming all three stage one factors are satisfied, the court
moves on to the second stage and asks whether the challenged
conduct is designed principally to ensure the continued availabil-
ity of the platform's differentiated products. If so, the relevant
market should encompass the market segments in which all sides
of the platform operate.
I. ANTITRUST MARKET DEFINITION
A market is a medium for the exchange of goods or services.10
For antitrust purposes, a relevant market is simply a market in
which "a firm can raise prices above the competitive level without
losing so many sales that the price increase would be unprofita-
ble."11 The judicial process of determining relevance is called
"market definition." It is important because antitrust plaintiffs
must "prove harm ... to the competitive process,"12 which often
10 See Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (Thomson Reuters 10th ed 2014) (defining a mar-
ket as a "place of commercial activity in which goods or services are bought and sold").
11 Id at 1115 (defining a relevant market as simply "a market that is capable of being
monopolized").
12 NYNEX Corp v Discon, Inc, 525 US 128, 135 (1998).
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entails "a fact-intensive analysis of the challenged conduct ...
and its context."13 Defining the extent of the relevant market pro-
vides that context.
For example, consider the Government's monopolization
claim in United States v E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co14 ("Cello-
phane"). At the time of the claim, du Pont's raw output amounted
to roughly 75 percent of the US market for cellophane.15 That
same raw output, however, amounted to only 17.9 percent of the
broader market for flexible packaging materials. 16 The central is-
sue, then, was whether the relevant product market was that for
cellophane specifically or that for all flexible packaging materials.
The Court held that the relevant market included all flexible
packaging materials, and it considered du Pont's 17.9 percent
share of that larger market insufficient for a finding of monopoli-
zation.17 Apart from demonstrating that market definition is often
outcome determinative, Cellophane also illustrates the concept of
comparative harm. In particular, the anticompetitive impact of a
challenged practice-here, du Pont's cellophane share-may be
outsized in a narrower market and insignificant in a broader one.
This Part explores the challenges inherent in market defini-
tion. Part L.A situates market definition within the statutory and
judicial framework of the major antitrust enforcement laws. It
clarifies the legal requirements for market definition and answers
the question, "Why define the market?" Part I.B frames market
definition as a contentious problem that is central to the outcome
of an antitrust case. It also chronicles Supreme Court jurispru-
dence designed to guide and structure lower courts' definition pro-
cesses. Part I.C portrays market definition as problematic be-
cause of its economic and statistical complexity.
13 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Market
Definition *321 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Oct 11, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/5QVX-AJ8Y (emphasis added).
14 351 US 377 (1956).
15 Id at 379.
16 Id at 399.
17 See id at 400, 403-04. See also text accompanying notes 76-77 (exploring problems
with the Cellophane Court's approach).
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A. Background and Judicial Requirements for Market
Definition
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), state governments, and ap-
propriately injured private plaintiffs may bring antitrust enforce-
ment actions in federal court.18 The three core federal antitrust
enforcement laws are the Sherman Act,19 the Clayton Act,20 and
the Federal Trade Commission Act2l (FTC Act). Of these, §§ 1-2
of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act make up over 90
percent of the investigative workload of the DOJ's Antitrust
Division.22 As discussed in this Section, the requirement for mar-
ket definition stems from judicial interpretation of these statutes.
Defining the relevant market typically involves establishing
both the product market and the geographic market.23 The prod-
uct market is the "part of a relevant market that applies to a
firm's particular product."24 It is defined by "identifying all reason-
able substitutes for the product and by determining whether these
substitutes limit the firm's ability to affect prices."25 The geo-
graphic market is the "part of a relevant market that identifies
18 See 15 USC § 15a (creating standing for the United States); 15 USC § 15c (creating
standing for the states); 15 USC § 15 (creating private standing). See also Brunswick Corp
v Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477, 489 (1977) (explaining that a private plaintiffs
standing requires "prov[ing] antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful").
19 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1 et seq.
20 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 12 et seq.
21 38 Stat 717 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 45 et seq.
22 See Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2006-2015 *1 (DOJ, July 8, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/UDU2-XF2X. During fiscal years 2006 to 2015, the DOJ's
Antitrust Division initiated 511 Sherman Act § 1 restraint-of-trade investigations, 19
Sherman Act § 2 monopoly investigations, and 789 Clayton Act § 7 merger investigations.
In the same time period, it brought only 81 investigations under other statutes. Id. The
FTC investigates Sherman and Clayton Act claims by way of the FTC Act § 5. See Times-
Picayune Publishing Co v United States, 345 US 594, 609 (1953) (stating that an "arrange-
ment transgresse[d] § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, since minimally that section
registers violations of the Clayton and Sherman Acts").
23 See Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 324 (1962) (explaining that the
"'area of effective competition' must be determined by reference to a product market ...
and a geographic market").
24 Black's Law Dictionary at 1114 (cited in note 10).
25 Id. For example, if a creamery's decision to raise butter prices would prompt con-
sumer substitution to margarine, the firm's ability to raise prices is constrained, and the
product market might include both butter and margarine.
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the regions in which a firm might compete."26 Together, the prod-
uct and geographic markets provide the backdrop against which
courts evaluate the impact of the challenged conduct.
The requirement for market definition in § 1 of the Sherman
Act is judicial rather than statutory. The Act's sweeping language
simply bars "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States."27 Subsequent jurisprudence narrowed the
Act's broad language by holding that "Congress intended to out-
law only unreasonable restraints."28 As such, an antitrust plaintiff
must show (1) the existence of an agreement (2) that unreasona-
bly restrains trade or commerce and (3) that implicates interstate
or foreign commerce. 29 Market definition is part of the second ele-
ment--evaluating reasonableness typically requires the context
of relevant product and geographic markets.30
In § 1 cases, courts evaluate unreasonable restraints using
the aptly named "rule of reason"-a judicial doctrine based on the
"totality of economic circumstances."3' Circuit courts have estab-
lished their own procedures for rule-of-reason analysis. For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit uses a burden-shifting framework. Under
this approach, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of "showing that
the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on compe-
tition as a whole in the relevant market."32 Notably, this includes
the requirement to sufficiently plead a relevant market.33 If the
plaintiff meets its burden, responsibility shifts to the defendants
26 Id ("If a firm can raise prices or cut production without causing a quick influx of
supply to the area from outside sources, that firm is operating in a distinct geographic
market.").
27 Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat at 209, 15 USC § 1.
28 State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 10 (1997) (emphasis added).
29 See, for example, Bhan v NME Hospitals, Inc, 929 F2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir 1991).
30 See id at 1410, 1413 ("To determine whether a practice unreasonably restrains
trade, . . . [tihe focus is on ... competition in a relevant market."). Part I.B discusses a
class of restraints for which market definition is not necessary. Such restraints are pre-
sumed anticompetitive, and defendants do not receive the contextual benefit of framing the
alleged harm in a favorably scoped relevant market. See text accompanying notes 47-50.
31 Black's Law Dictionary at 1532 (cited in note 10). See also Continental TV, Inc v
GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36, 49 (1977) (stating that, under the rule of reason, courts
weigh "all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition").
32 Capital Imaging Associates, PC v Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc, 996 F2d
537, 543 (2d Cir 1993) (emphasis omitted).
33 See Concord Associates, LP v Entertainment Properties Trust, 817 F3d 46, 54 (2d
Cir 2016).
2064
Testing for Multisided Platform Effects
to establish the "redeeming virtues" of their arrangement. 34 De-
fendants often frame this evidence by defining a different version
of the relevant market.3s The burden then shifts back to the plain-
tiff to show that these benefits could have been achieved through
less restrictive alternatives.36
The requirement for market definition in § 2 of the Sherman
Act is likewise judicial. Its statutory language simply targets mo-
nopolies. Specifically, § 2 criminalizes the conduct of those who
would "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States."37 As the
Supreme Court explained in United States v Grinnell Corp:38
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the rel-
evant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.39
The notion of the relevant market thus appears directly in the
first element as the reference against which courts measure § 2
monopoly power.
The requirement for market definition in § 7 of the Clayton
Act is also judicial. Congress enacted the statute in 1914 "because
[it] concluded that the Sherman Act's prohibition against mergers
was not adequate."40 The Clayton Act thus differs from the
Sherman Act in proscribing "certain combinations of competitors"
before they are able to produce "any actual injury, either to com-
petitors or to competition."41 The Supreme Court has reasoned
34 Capital Imaging, 996 F2d at 543.
35 See, for example, United States v Visa U.SA., Inc, 344 F3d 229, 238-39 (2d Cir
2003) (adopting the plaintiff's assertion that the product market consisted of general-pur-
pose payment cards and rejecting a broader market proposed by the defendants consisting
of cash, checks, debit cards, and credit cards).
36 Capital Imaging, 996 F2d at 543.
37 Sherman Act § 2, 26 Stat at 209, 15 USC § 2.
38 384 US 563 (1966).
39 Id at 570-71.
40 Cargill, Inc v Monfort of Colorado, Inc, 479 US 104, 124 (1986) (Stevens dissent-
ing). See also Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies, S Rep No 63-698, 63d Cong, 2d Sess 1
(1914) (stating that the Clayton Act sought "to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade
practices which . .. are not covered by [the Sherman Act], or other existing antitrust acts").
41 Cargill, 479 US at 124 (Stevens dissenting) (maintaining that "[t]he legislative
history teaches us that [the Act's] delphic language was designed 'to cope with monopolis-
tic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would
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that "Section 7 is designed to . . . arrest in their incipiency re-
straints or monopolies in a relevant market which, as a reasona-
ble probability, appear at the time of suit likely to result from
the acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of the stock
of any other corporation."42 In merger claims, then, market defi-
nition again provides context for the proposed combination's
likely impact.
B. Market Definition as a Problem of Context
Few question that market definition is central to antitrust
law.43 Delineating the relevant market is among the first steps
accomplished in any competition analysis and has been described
as "one of the most important analytical tools for competition au-
thorities."44 Further, winning at market definition often means
winning the case. As discussed above, comparing du Pont's cello-
phane output to the market for all flexible packaging materials
resulted in a 17.9 percent share, while comparing it to the market
for cellophane revealed a 75 percent share.45 Because the Court
looked to market share to inform the degree of anticompetitive
impact,46 determining the basis for this comparison was largely
outcome determinative.
Anything that determines the outcome is predictably conten-
tious, so the Court's market-definition jurisprudence reduces the
scope of the definitional problem for the lower courts through two
mechanisms. First, courts selectively apply the rule of reason dis-
cussed in Part I.A. Second, in rule-of-reason cases, courts apply
rules that structure and focus the process of market definition.
As to the first, certain practices are "so plainly anticompeti-
tive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality."47 Behaviors on this short, judge-made list per se
violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. For instance, fixing prices across
justify a Sherman Act proceeding'). See also Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat at 731-32, 15 USC
§ 18 (barring transactions in which "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
42 United States v E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co, 353 US 586, 589 (1957).
43 Part I.C briefly considers whether market definition should be central to antitrust.
44 See Market Definition at *21 (cited in note 13).
45 See text accompanying notes 14-17 (explaining that the anticompetitive impact of
a challenged practice-here, du Pont's market share-may be large in a narrower market
and insignificant in a broader one).
46 Cellophane, 351 US at 399.
47 Texaco Inc v Dagher, 547 US 1, 5 (2006), quoting National Society of Professional
Engineers v United States, 435 US 679, 692 (1978).
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competitors within an industry is per se illegal.48 Colluding to rig
bids for contract awards is another example.49 These behaviors
invoke a bright-line rule that makes the context supplied by a rel-
ative market unnecessary: harm to competition "is presumed
from the nature of the conduct."o
Importantly, this means that the Court can control the scope
of the definitional problem for Sherman Act § 1 offenses by decid-
ing which conduct should require market definition in the first
place. Challenges to behaviors classified as per se illegal avoid
market definition while the Court subjects the remainder to mar-
ket definition via the standard-like rule of reason.51 Additionally,
its behavior-by-behavior approach allows the Court to adjust the
per se list to account for changes in industry conditions or devel-
opments in analytical tools that permit a more finely tailored
analysis.52
Second, the Court's jurisprudence structures and focuses the
definitional process for rule-of-reason cases under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, as well as for Sherman Act § 2 and Clayton Act
cases. 53 The modern definition of the relevant product market
hinges on substitutable-or functionally interchangeable-prod-
ucts. This stems from the Cellophane Court's holding that
"[d]etermination of the competitive market for commodities de-
pends on how different from one another are the offered commod-
ities in character or use, how far buyers will go to substitute one
commodity for another."5 The Court went on to explain:
The ultimate consideration . . . is whether the defendants
control the price and competition in the market . . . they are
48 See Catalano, Inc v Target Sales, Inc, 446 US 643, 647 (1980) ("A horizontal agree-
ment to fix prices is the archetypal example of such a practice.").
49 See Swift & Co v United States, 196 US 375, 400 (1905).
50 Market Definition at *321 (cited in note 13).
51 See notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
52 See note 75 and accompanying text. For example, the Court had previously sup-
ported the notion of per se illegality for agreements between manufacturers and their dis-
tributors to set minimum resale prices. See Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons,
220 US 373, 408-09 (1911). The Court later changed course to hold that these agreements
were not per se illegal and should instead be evaluated in context. See Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007) ("[T]he Court's decision in [Dr.
Miles] is now overruled. Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of
reason.").
53 While the rule of reason applies to Sherman Act § 1 reasonableness inquiries, some
courts have pursued a similar line of analysis under § 2. See United States v Microsoft
Corp, 253 F3d 34, 58-59 (DC Cir 2001) (discussing a "general rule" for evaluating exclu-
sionary conduct).
54 Cellophane, 351 US at 393.
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charged with monopolizing. . . . [Clontrol in the above sense
of the relevant market depends upon the availability of alter-
native commodities for buyers: i.e., whether there is a cross-
elasticity of demand between cellophane and the other
wrappings. This interchangeability is largely gauged by the
purchase of competing products for similar uses considering
the price, characteristics and adaptability of the competing
commodities.55
The Court found that price decreases for cellophane caused "a
considerable number of customers of other flexible wrappings to
switch" and thus broadly defined the relevant market to include
all flexible packaging materials.56 In so doing, the Court en-
shrined cross-elasticity of demand as a definitional tool.
A few years after Cellophane, the Court reinforced its inter-
changeability approach when the Government, concerned about
potentially anticompetitive effects,57 brought an action under the
Clayton Act to enjoin the merger of two shoe retailers in Brown
Shoe Co v United States.58 The Court expanded Cellophane's ap-
proach, at the risk of creating further confusion, by explaining
that within a "broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes."59 Instead of providing a bright-line rule to determine
whether one is in a broad market or a submarket, the Court pro-
vided a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider: (1) industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity,
(2) the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, (3) unique pro-
duction facilities, (4) distinct customers, (5) distinct prices,
(6) sensitivity to price changes, and (7) specialized vendors.60 By
this light, it found the relevant lines of commerce were "men's,
women's, and children's shoes," declining to recognize the appel-
lant's narrower "price/quality" distinctions.61
55 Id at 380-81. Cross-elasticity of demand is a measure of how functionally inter-
changeable competing commodities are from the consumer's perspective. For example, if
an increase in the price of cellophane prompts significant substitution to other flexible
packaging materials, the cross-elasticity of demand is high. For measurement techniques,
see note 75.
56 Cellophane, 351 US at 400.
57 For a further discussion of anticompetitive effects, see Part II.B.
58 370 US 294 (1962).
59 Id at 325.
eo See id.
61 Id at 326.
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Shortly after Brown Shoe, the Court endorsed the considera-
tion of relevant submarkets. In Grinnell, a seller of monitored
burglary, fire, and flood alarm services argued against § 2
Sherman Act allegations by maintaining that the relevant market
should be defined broadly to include any product that set off an
audible alarm at the homeowner's residence, even if that alarm
was not centrally monitored in the way Grinnell's was.6 2 The
Court held that there is "no barrier to combining in a single mar-
ket a number of different products or services where that combi-
nation reflects commercial realities."3 That said, the Court con-
sidered substitutability, finding that Grinnell's suggested
combination of centrally and noncentrally monitored systems was
too broad to reflect the commercial reality that some portions of
the consumer population could not easily substitute between the
two types of systems. 64 The Court then affirmed the district
court's definition of the relevant market as that submarket of the
alarm industry consisting of accredited central station services.1
Grinnell thus stands for the proposition that courts may fix the
relevant market at the level of one or more submarkets, so long
as the definition reflects commercial realities.
Several decades later, in Eastman Kodak Co v Image
Technical Services, Inc,66 the Court issued an oft-cited holding
that "[t]he proper market definition ... can be determined only
after a factual inquiry into the 'commercial realities' faced by con-
sumers."67 A group of independent equipment servicing firms
brought an action under §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act, alleging that
Kodak's policy of tying the sale of replacement parts to its sale of
repair service undermined competing independent repair ser-
vices. The Court considered the actual set of choices facing Kodak
equipment owners-namely, from whom service and parts were
available-in its assessment of commercial realities.5 Kodak, like
62 Grinnell, 384 US at 571-74.
63 Id at 572.
64 Id at 572-74 ("Though some customers may be willing to accept higher insurance
rates in favor of cheaper forms of protection, others will not be willing or able to risk seri-
ous interruption to their businesses, even though covered by insurance, and will thus be
unwilling to consider anything but central station protection.").
65 Id at 571, 575.
66 504 US 451 (1992).
67 Id at 482.
68 Id at 481-82.
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Grinnell, stands for the proposition that a court may fix the rele-
vant market at the level of one or more submarkets, so long as the
definition reflects commercial realities.
Thus, the Court's market-definition jurisprudence accom-
plishes two major things. First, it reduces the scope of the defini-
tional problem by actively managing a list of per se illegal behav-
iors that do not require reference to a relevant market. Second,
for behaviors not on this list, the Court structures and focuses the
process of market definition by endorsing a cross-elasticity-of-
demand approach premised on substitutability, by recognizing
the possibility that relevant submarkets may exist, and by leav-
ing the appropriate delineation to judicial factual inquiry into the
commercial realities faced by consumers.
C. Market Definition as a Problem of Complexity
Despite the Court's scope-limiting definitional jurisprudence,
lower courts conducting "factual inquir[ies] into [] 'commercial
realities"'69 still must contend with the sheer complexity of defin-
ing a relevant market. Given their duty to oversee the definitional
process, this pushes many judges outside their comfort zones.
Two factors aggravate the problem. First, antitrust litigation de-
pends heavily on complicated definitional tools and experts. Sec-
ond, even seemingly straightforward concepts often have counter-
intuitive implications.
As to the first, because the relevant market is simultaneously
complex, central to the outcome, and determined adversarially, it
is unsurprising that reliance on experts has increased signifi-
cantly in recent decades.70 Commentators attribute this depend-
ence both to successes in the law-and-economics movement that
have made case-by-case analysis more feasible and to advances in
industrial organization-the economic field concerned with anti-
trust-that have rendered it "more mathematically rigorous and
69 Id at 482.
70 See Michael J. Mandel, Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses, 13 J
Econ Persp 113, 114 (Spring 1999) (describing "explosive growth in the economic consult-
ing business in general, and the expert testimony and economic litigation support business
in particular").
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technically demanding."71 Experts, in turn, rely on complex eco-
nomic and statistical analyses to the point that they are now
"standard fare in modern antitrust litigation."72
While these developments permit a more tailored approach
to evaluating the challenged conduct, they come at a cost. Judge
Richard Posner observed that "[e]conometrics is such a difficult
subject that it is unrealistic to expect the average judge or juror
to be able to understand all the criticisms of an econometric study,
no matter how skillful the econometrician is in explaining a study
to a lay audience."73 Further, perhaps the one thing more con-
founding than complexity is a variety of complexity. In summariz-
ing the legislative history of the 1950 amendments to § 7 of the
Clayton Act, the Brown Shoe Court concluded that Congress
"provid[ed] no definite quantitative or qualitative tests by which
enforcement agencies could gauge the effects of a given merger,"
permitting instead a variety of methods.74 Market definition thus
implicates a number of technical tools to implement Cellophane's
interchangeability approach.75
Second, as if variety of complexity were not enough, even
seemingly straightforward concepts often have counterintuitive
implications. Among these, the Cellophane fallacy is infamous.
Recall that du Pont's cellophane output amounted to roughly 75
percent of the US cellophane market but less than 18 percent of
the flexible packaging materials market, and that the Court held
71 Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for General-
ist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J L
& Econ 1, 2 (2011) (discussing a shift toward rule-of-reason analysis over per se illegality).
72 Id at 3. In a recent survey of 714 antitrust cases in federal district courts, the
written opinions collectively included the terms "expert reports" 332 times, "statistics" 290
times, "expert witnesses" 230 times, and "regression" 113 times. See id at 8. The survey
reveals a variability in case complexity, evidenced, for example, by one opinion alone men-
tioning "regression" 46 times. See id.
73 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J
Econ Persp 91, 96 (Spring 1999). Econometric analysis entails applying mathematical and
statistical tools to economic data. For more on econometrics, see generally William H.
Green, Econometric Analysis (Pearson 8th ed 2017).
74 Brown Shoe, 370 US at 321.
75 These include the hypothetical monopolist test, as well as diversion ratios and con-
ditional logit demand analysis. For more background, see Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines *8-10 (Aug 19, 2010), archived
at http://perma.cc/5JCK-DJBB (discussing the hypothetical monopolist test). See also gen-
erally Lars Mathiesen, Oivind Anti Nilsen, and Lars Sergard, Merger Simulations with
Observed Diversion Ratios, 31 Intl Rev L & Econ 83 (2011) (demonstrating the utility of
diversion ratios in merger simulations for antitrust cases); Daniel McFadden, Conditional
Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in Paul Zarembka, ed, Frontiers in Econo-
metrics 105 (Academic Press 1974) (originating conditional logit demand analysis).
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that du Pont had not monopolized the relevant market, which it
concluded was all flexible packaging materials.76 Unfortunately,
the argument may be inconclusive. Imagine du Pont was a mo-
nopolist and had already raised prices accordingly. When prices
are high, consumers may view some flexible packaging products
as substitutes, not because they are functionally interchangeable,
but because cellophane is simply too expensive. Including this
type of substitution toward other flexible packaging materials
could lead to an overbroad definition of the relevant market and the
contradictory conclusion that du Pont was not a monopolist at all.77
This complexity has engendered two types of responses. 78
Some have suggested that the tension between the limitations of
generalist judges and their duty to preside over the intricacies of
market definition might be neatly resolved by specialized anti-
trust courts. While such a change appears unlikely, empirical
studies demonstrating higher rates of appeals for district-court
judges with little antitrust training support this argument.79 An-
other approach has been the development of tools that do not rely
on market definition.80 Although the DOJ and the FTC have em-
braced the approach as a conceptual supplement to market defi-
nition,8' current tools remain ill suited to the task of proceeding
absent market definition, and courts have been loath to adopt
them.82
76 See text accompanying notes 14-17.
77 See George W. Stocking and Willard F. Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New
Competition, 45 Am Econ Rev 29, 53-54 (1955). The key for courts is to scrutinize whether
products are actually functional substitutes.
78 For an examination of the relative merits of specialized courts and generalist
courts in reviewing antitrust cases, see generally Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D.
Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists versus Generalists, 36 Fordham Intl L J 788 (2013).
79 See Baye and Wright, 54 J L & Econ at 13-19 (cited in note 71). The authors found
basic economic training for jurists decreased appeals by over 10 percent for simple cases
but did not measurably reduce appeals of more complex cases. See id at 15-16.
80 See generally Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal
Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 BE J Theoretical Econ 1 (2010).
81 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at *21 (cited in note 75) (including upward pric-
ing pressure among the measurement tools sanctioned by regulators as supplements to
market definition).
82 See City of New York v Group Health, Inc, 649 F3d 151, 158 (2d Cir 2011) ("While
the [plaintiff] explains the Upward Pricing Pressure test's usefulness in assessing the im-
pact of a merger, it does not explain how the test can substitute for a definition of the
relevant market in the pleadings."). But see United States v Birks, 2009 WL 1702030, *2
n 2 (D NJ) (admitting an expert's testimony involving upward pricing pressure).
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All of this speaks to the idea that market definition is a judi-
cially required, totality-of-the-circumstances process. It is adver-
sarial rather than arbitrary, sophisticated rather than simple,
and central rather than superfluous. In short, the outcome of the
case often depends on how the lines are drawn-and these lines
are battle lines.
While the process itself continues to evolve, so do industry
conditions. Faced with new problems, firms have responded by
devising new business methods or modifying old ones. But
changed circumstances add an additional wrinkle to the defini-
tional process. Increased recognition of the platform-based as-
pects of certain businesses has generated unanswered questions
about whether and how the relevant market inquiry should ac-
count for them. This perceived gap forms the basis for Part II.
II. THE CHALLENGE POSED BY MULTISIDED PLATFORMS
A platform is a business method employed by a firm to "ena-
ble interactions between [] groups of users, each of which cares
about the size and attributes of the other group[s] on the same
platform."83 By extension, one can define a multisided platform as
encompassing two or more such user groups. Although no two
business methods are identical, the class exhibiting multisided-
ness merits special treatment. In particular, it raises "various
novel and challenging empirical and analytical issues" during
market definition.84
This Part explores the importance of multisidedness to mar-
ket definition. Part II.A frames multisidedness as a developing
concept that attempts to solve two problems-transaction costs
and network externalities created by interconnected user
83 Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright, Two-Sided Markets (Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), archived at http://perma.ccP44X-X5M9. See also Black's Law Dictionary at 240
(cited in note 10) (describing a business method as a "way or an aspect of a way in which
a commercial enterprise is operated"). Two-sided platforms are often called "two-sided
markets." This Comment adopts the platform terminology to avoid confounding the
market-definition question and because sidedness is properly an attribute of the business
method rather than the market. See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Anti-
trust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses, in Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol,
eds, 1 The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics 404, 404 n 1 (Oxford
2015) (stating that "multisidedness is an attribute of an individual business that may not
always be shared by all of its competitors" in a market).
84 Jith Jayaratne and Janusz A. Ordover, Economics and Competition Policy: A Two-
Sided Market?, 27 Antitrust 78, 80 (Fall 2012).
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groups-and Part II.B chronicles divergent judicial opinions on the
topic. This state of affairs suggests the value of a test for multisid-
edness, which Part III develops.
A. Economic Concept of Multisidedness
Payment cards are a canonical example of a multisided plat-
form.85 In this case, the platform is the payment architecture
through which two groups-merchants and consumers-inter-
act.86 On one side of the platform, rivals like Visa, MasterCard,
American Express ("Amex"), and Discover compete to sell net-
work services to merchants.87 That product involves authoriza-
tion, settlement, and clearance of transactions.88 On the other
side, Visa, MasterCard, Amex, and Discover compete to issue
cards and provide services to card-holding consumers. 89 This Sec-
tion extends the payment-card example to consider three issues
addressed by multisided platforms.
First, multisided platforms may be thought of as solving a
problem of transaction costs-a broad term including market-
place bargaining, search, information, and enforcement costs. Be-
fore the advent of payment cards, merchants could engage in cash
transactions or extend credit to individual consumers.90 Differ-
ences in shopping behavior make "transactions with some cus-
tomers more profitable for the merchant than transactions with
others."91 Hence, for centuries, merchants have selectively ex-
tended open-book credit to consumers with "high time costs, high
incomes, and high wealth positions" to foster repeat business.92
85 See generally William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal
and Economic Perspectives, 26 J L & Econ 541 (1983). See also Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev at
1642 (cited in note 5).
86 See Baxter, 26 J L & Econ at 544 (cited in note 85) (explaining that "each use of a
credit card by a card holder must be matched by precisely one act of acceptance of the card
. . . by a merchant").
87 See United States v Visa U.S.A., Inc, 344 F3d 229, 239 (2d Cir 2003).
88 Id.
89 See id. This competition plays out through intermediary banks in the case of
Visa and MasterCard and directly to consumers in the case of Amex and Discover. See
United States v American Express, 838 F3d 179, 188-89 (2d Cir 2016) ("Amex"), cert
granted, Ohio v American Express Co, 2017 WL 2444673 (US) (explaining the difference
between open- and closed-loop systems).
90 This example somewhat simplifies the number of options available to merchants.
91 Baxter, 26 J L & Econ at 572 (cited in note 85).
92 Id (stating that a consumer with high time costs tends to "shop when it is conven-
ient for him rather than waiting for . . . sale[s]," tends to "consume less time of sales per-
sonnel," and tends to "decide more quickly because he conceives his quest to be locating
the items he wants rather than making closely balanced tradeoffs with reference to price").
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Additionally, when compared to cash, credit transactions prompt
increased consumer willingness to pay, which translates into in-
creased expenditures.9s Credit is thus desirable to merchants in
the sense that its usage increases gross revenues. Consumers
likewise benefit by avoiding the risk of carrying cash and the time
costs involved with traveler's checks.94 While mutually beneficial,
extending credit on individual terms is costly. Merchants must
invest in determining individual creditworthiness, writing terms,
billing periodically, managing collection, and-importantly-ab-
sorbing the cost of capital.96 Conversely, consumers face a search
problem in identifying merchants willing to extend credit. Pay-
ment platforms alleviate these transaction costs by facilitating
credit and decreasing search costs.
Second, multisided platforms address the problem of inter-
connected demand. "Cardholders value credit or debit cards only
to the extent that these are accepted by the merchants they pat-
ronize; affiliated merchants benefit from a widespread diffusion
of cards among consumers."e Hence, merchant demand for net-
work services and consumer demand for card issuance are linked
by "indirect network effects," which exist when a consumer's will-
ingness to pay depends on "the number of consumers . . . of an-
other product."97 Because neither side accounts for these effects,
one can think of them as externalities.98 A major role of the multi-
sided platform is to internalize these effects.
93 See Drazen Prelec and Duncan Simester, Always Leave Home without It: A Further
Investigation of the Credit-Card Effect on Willingness to Pay, 12 Mktg Let 5, 10-11 (2001).
94 Baxter, 26 J L & Econ at 573 (cited in note 85).
95 Id at 754. The cost of capital is the forgone return associated with extending credit
instead of having put the same money in an interest-bearing investment.
96 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Mar-
kets, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc 990, 990 (2003).
97 Lapo Filistrucchi, et al, Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Prac-
tice, 10 J Competition L & Econ 293, 296-97 & n 8 (2014) (distinguishing between direct
and indirect network effects). For direct network effects, "willingness to pay for a product
depends on the number of other consumers . . . of the same product." Id. For example, a
direct network effect might exist for a particular chat application. There would be low
demand for it if one's friends and colleagues (that is, the same user group) were not also
users. As to indirect network effects, few people would demand a credit card that few mer-
chants (that is, a different user group) will accept.
98 See id at 297. An externality is simply an effect imposed on another without taking
it into account. There would be no externality if both products (card issuance and network
services) were purchased by the same buyer because that buyer would presumably take
both prices into account. See id. The externality here arises because each buyer purchases
only one product and considers that product's price alone. Absent the platform, this would
result in a suboptimal quantity of interactions.
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This internalization entails the cost of getting all necessary
sides onboard and keeping sufficient proportions of each group in
place.99 Amex reduced this onboarding cost by leveraging its
preexisting customer base in the travel and entertainment indus-
try, and before entering the payment-card market, Visa and
MasterCard collaborated to pool merchants. 00 Additionally, pric-
ing strategy is critical to getting and keeping all sides onboard.
Because one group may be harder to attract than another, plat-
forms charge different prices to each user group. Difficult-to-
attract groups may even receive below-cost pricing.101 This is the
situation in the payment-card industry: some cardholders pay a
reduced-or even negative-price by receiving rewards, while
merchants pay positive prices.10 2 Thus, an essential function of a
multisided platform is to manage this interconnected demand via
tailored cross-subsidization.
Third, multisided platform analysis is new enough that the
economic literature has yet to settle on definitive bounds for the
concept. In other words, what precisely is meant by
multisidedness is controversial. A recent survey identified over
two hundred topical papers in print or working format that ap-
peared between 2007 and 2015.103 Some commentators have ad-
vocated for broad interpretations, noting that "virtually all mar-
kets might be two-sided to some extent," while simultaneously
recognizing that such sidedness "is not always quantitatively im-
portant."104 Yet this presents a challenge for courts engaged in
market definition. Because the anticompetitive impact of a chal-
lenged practice may be outsized in a narrower market and insig-
nificant in a broader one, plaintiffs may have incentives to plead
narrower relevant markets while defendants prefer broader ones.
In the presence of multisidedness, one would expect plaintiffs to
contend that certain sides of the platform should be excluded from
the definition of the relevant market. This was the case in United
States v Visa U.S.A., Inc,105 which involved a § 1 Sherman Act
99 These starting costs are not to be confused with entry barriers in the sense of § 2
Sherman Act monopolization.
100 Amex, 838 F3d at 187.
101 See Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc at 1010-12 (cited in note 96).
102 Id at 1013 ("A higher interchange fee is ... passed through to consumers in the
form of lower card fees and higher card benefits . . . [and] passed through to merchants,
who pay a higher merchant discount.").
103 Evans and Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses
at 405 (cited in note 83).
104 Rysman, 23 J Econ Persp at 127 (cited in note 4).
105 344 F3d 229 (2d Cir 2003).
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claim. The Government contended that the relevant market
should exclude the market in which the card-issuing side of the
platform operated, focusing instead on the market in which Visa
provided network services to merchants.lo6 One might then expect
a defendant facing this definition to counter by including both the
market for network services and the market for card issuance in
its proposed definition.107 Thus, the problem of market definition
is exacerbated when the notion of multisidedness itself is subject
to uncertainty. In that case, plaintiffs could not only argue for
narrower definitions of the relevant market, but they could also
argue for more restrictive interpretations of the concept of multi-
sidedness itself. As Part II.B discusses, these challenges have led
to a series of nebulous lower-court opinions.
B. Nebulous Opinions on Multisided Platforms
Judicial treatment of multisidedness during market defini-
tion is nascent, and courts have predictably differed in how to
navigate the topic. This Section uses Sherman Act § 1 cases as a
vehicle for exploring their differences. Specifically, the differences
reflect alternate approaches to implementing § l's rule of reason
in the presence of multisidedness.
As discussed in Part I.A, rule-of-reason analysis under § 1 of
the Sherman Act implicates market definition.o8 Conditional on
a well-defined market, the rule of reason may be thought of as a
balancing test: determining whether a restraint is unreasonable
is akin to asking "whether its anticompetitive effects outweigh its
procompetitive effects."109 Because courts may trade off pro- and
106 Id at 239-40. The court held for the plaintiffs that network services and card issu-
ance were separate markets rather than a single relevant market. See id at 240.
107 Visa and codefendant MasterCard took another approach and attempted to
broaden the market by including other forms of payment. See id at 239 (discussing "cash,
checks, debit cards, and proprietary cards" like Sears or Macy's cards). Amex, in subse-
quent litigation, however, did advocate for a single relevant market encompassing both
network services and card issuance. See United States v American Express Co, 88 F Supp
3d 143, 172 (EDNY 2015), revd, 838 F3d 179 (2d Cir 2016). While not the focus of this
Comment, a defendant may also have strategic reasons for defining the relevant market
narrowly, such as favorably framing the balance of pro- and anticompetitive impacts.
108 See notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
109 Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, 495 US 328, 342 (1990). When applica-
ble, analysis of pro- and anticompetitive trade-offs occurs in concert with the courts' bur-
den-shifting frameworks. For example, once a plaintiff in the Third Circuit establishes the
anticompetitive nature of the challenged conduct and the defendant proffers procompeti-
tive justifications, the plaintiff "may then either rebut those justifications or demonstrate
that the anticompetitive harm outweighs the procompetitive benefit." Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc v Warner Chilcott Public Ltd, 838 F3d 421, 438 (3d Cir 2016). See
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anticompetitive effects within the relevant market,lo defining the
relevant market is tantamount to establishing the space of allow-
able trade-offs. In particular, defining the relevant market to in-
clude all sides of the platform creates a broader space of allowable
pro- and anticompetitive trade-offs: it provides the opportunity to
trade procompetitive effects on one side of the platform for anti-
competitive effects on the other side.
This environment creates high stakes that run throughout a
growing body of case law. By considering cases that address the
issue either directly or indirectly, this Section examines the ways
in which lower courts have wrestled with whether and how to in-
corporate the transaction-cost and interconnected-demand fea-
tures of multisidedness during market definition. The approaches
may be grouped into those that have minimized the impact of
multisidedness on market definition, those that have hedged on
the issue, and those that have considered evidence of multisided-
ness directly.
1. Some courts have minimized multisidedness's impact on
market definition.
Cases that define the relevant market as encompassing fewer
than all sides of the platform narrow the space of allowable pro-
and anticompetitive trade-offs and effectively eliminate a defend-
ant's arguments that it manages interconnected demand. These
may include actions taken to onboard various constituencies as
well as the provision of benefits, such as differential pricing,
needed to keep them on the platform." The Second Circuit took
this approach in Visa, which involved a Sherman Act § 1 claim.112
The Government challenged exclusivity rules put in place by Visa
and MasterCard that prohibited their member banks from issu-
ing Amex and Discover cards,113 meaning that bank customers
would have to look elsewhere for these products. In applying
also McWane, Inc v Federal Trade Commission, 783 F3d 814, 833 (11th Cir 2015) (extend-
ing analysis of pro- and anticompetitive harms to a Sherman Act § 2 monopoly mainte-
nance claim); Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden
Shifting, 1 Persp Antitrust 1, 2 (Jan 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/HA4E-9NVD (ex-
plaining that almost 90 percent of rule-of-reason cases are dismissed for failure to estab-
lish anticompetitive effect prior to reaching the balancing stage).
110 See Sullivan v National Football League, 34 F3d 1091, 1111 (1st Cir 1994); Golden
v Kentile Floors, Inc, 475 F2d 288, 290 (5th Cir 1973).
Il See notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
112 See Visa, 344 F3d at 234.
113 Id at 237.
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Cellophane's interchangeability test, the court concluded that
network services lacked reasonable substitutes, and it likewise
determined that cash, checks, debit cards, and proprietary cards
did not reasonably substitute for card issuance.11 4 Although
Grinnell said there is "no barrier to combining in a single market
a number of different products or services where that combination
reflects commercial realities,""1 the Second Circuit found that the
case involved "two interrelated, but separate, product markets."116
The court then evaluated the challenged conduct's effect on com-
petition in the network services market without reference to pro-
competitive benefits from the issuance side of the platform.117
The Second Circuit likewise restricted the space of allowable
pro- and anticompetitive trade-offs in United States v Apple,
Inc.118 The case involved price fixing between Apple and e-book
publishers in response to Amazon's low Kindle pricing.119
Although the court held that the organizer of a "price-fixing con-
spiracy" across competitors may not escape a finding of per se il-
legality under § 1 of the Sherman Act,120 it also conducted an ab-
breviated rule-of-reason analysis in the alternative.121 While e-
book platforms may exhibit multisidedness-with publishers on
one side122 and customers desiring access to a large variety of
works on the other-the court did not include both sides of the
platform in its eventual definition. Instead, its relevant market
included competition only between rivals like Amazon and Apple
for publisher contracts.1 23 This had the effect of limiting allowable
pro- and anticompetitive effects to those on the publisher side of
the platform. Accordingly, the court rejected Apple's arguments
that its entry "represented an important procompetitive benefit
of the horizontal price-fixing conspiracy it orchestrated."124
114 Id at 239.
115 Grinnell, 384 US at 572.
116 Visa, 344 F3d at 238.
117 See id at 239-40.
118 791 F3d 290 (2d Cir 2015).
119 See id at 326-29.
120 Id at 297.
121 See id at 329-35. See also California Dental Association v Federal Trade
Comission, 526 US 756, 779-81 (1999) (originating the abbreviated rule-of-reason
analysis).
122 The value to publishers of more consumers matters if compensation-which could
be structured in a number of ways-is paid per transaction.
123 See Apple, 791 F3d at 330-34.
124 Id at 334. In particular, the court rejected the idea that the procompetitive benefit
of more competitors in the market, due to Apple's entry, justified its price fixing. See id.
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Cases like Visa and Apple, which define the relevant market
as encompassing fewer than all sides of a platform, restrict the
space of allowable pro- and anticompetitive trade-offs and render
a defendant's management of interconnected demand irrelevant.
This is often fatal to the defendant's case. That said, even when
multisidedness legitimately exists, excluding it is not necessarily
inappropriate. This observation forms the basis for Part III.
2. Some circuits have hedged with respect to
interconnected market segments.
Not all courts have treated multisidedness directly. However,
knowing whether a court permits trade-offs across related market
segments-a more basic inquiry-may be indicative of how it
would view multisidedness.125 The Third Circuit, in King Drug Co
of Florence, Inc v SmithKline Beecham Corp,126 did not address
multisidedness directly and hedged on whether it would allow
trade-offs across markets. The case involved an agreement chal-
lenged under § 1 of the Sherman Act,127 in which the defendant-
a manufacturer of chewable epilepsy and bipolar disorder phar-
maceuticals-agreed to relinquish its right to produce an author-
ized generic for a certain period of time.128 In particular, the court
allowed that "at the pleading stage plaintiffs have sufficiently al-
leged that any procompetitive aspects of the chewables arrange-
ment were outweighed by the anticompetitive harm," but then
mused that "[iut may also be (though we do not decide) that 'pro-
competitive effects in one market cannot justify anticompetitive
effects in a separate market."'129 The ability to operate across dis-
tinct markets characterizes a multisided platform.130 Therefore,
the Third Circuit's reservation of judgment makes it hard to pre-
dict whether it will eventually incorporate multisidedness into
market definition.
The Ninth Circuit is likewise undecided whether pro- and anti-
competitive effects may be traded off across market segments. It
125 Multisided platforms manage the interconnected demand of user groups in market
segments on different sides of the same platform. See notes 96-102 and accompanying
text. Whether a court permits trade-offs across related market segments matters for
whether it would consider defining the relevant market to include all sides of the platform.
126 791 F3d 388 (3d Cir 2015).
127 See id at 392-93 (explaining that the plaintiff also brought a Sherman Act § 2
claim).
128 See id at 396-97.
129 Id at 410 & n 34.
130 See notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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wrestled with the issue in Paladin Associates, Inc v Montana
Power Co.131 In that case, a private plaintiff brought a § 1
Sherman Act case dealing with the assignment of natural gas
transportation rights. While the court had considered a market
for pipeline transportation, the defendants' customers testified
that the assignments had a procompetitive effect in the natural
gas commodity market. Acknowledging the effect, the court
stated, "It may be, however, that this procompetitive effect
should not be considered in our rule of reason analysis, based
on the theory that procompetitive effects in a separate market
cannot justify anti-competitive effects in the market . . . under
analysis."132
3. Other courts have considered evidence of
multisidedness.
Some courts have made implicit or explicit usage of multisid-
edness in arriving at their holdings. If multisided platforms solve
a transaction-cost problem between groups that have trouble in-
teracting absent the platform,133 then a significant challenge man-
aged by payment platforms is facilitating credit extension and
payment among the thousands of different banks used by mer-
chants and cardholders. National Bancard Corp v Visa U.S.A.,
Inc34 ("NaBanco") involved a privately enforced claim under § 1
of the Sherman Act in which NaBanco alleged that Visa ad-
dressed this problem anticompetitively.135
Understanding the claim requires a bird's-eye view of the
platform's mechanism, as shown in Figure 1.
131 328 F3d 1145 (9th Cir 2003).
132 Id at 1157 n 11. Further, the Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether language
in an earlier Supreme Court opinion that might support the interpretation was valid or
was "not controlling because it is a dictum or incomplete or obsolete." Id, citing United
States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596, 610 (1972) (stating that competition "cannot
be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or
groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more im-
portant sector").
133 See notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
134 779 F2d 592 (11th Cir 1986).
135 See id at 593.
2017] 2081
The University of Chicago Law Review





(Issuer) Issuer pays price
ss interchange fe
Issuer Cardholder eventually












pays price pays discount
es to fee
0 Merchant
When a cardholder makes a credit purchase using Visa or
MasterCard, the merchant's bank pays the merchant the full pur-
chase price and collects a discount fee from the merchant for per-
forming the service.136 Before doing so, the cardholder's bank typ-
ically extends credit to the cardholder and arranges to pay the
merchant's bank the purchase price less an interchange fee.137
This system solves the transaction-cost problem that would arise
if the merchant's bank had to bilaterally contract with each and
every cardholder's bank.138 A platform like Visa or MasterCard
sets the interchange fee directly, which, in turn, helps determine
the amount of the merchant's discount fee.
NaBanco claimed that Visa's practice of centrally setting the
interchange fee was tantamount to price fixing across competitors
within an industry.139 If supported by the facts, such price fixing
would be per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act.140 The
136 See Amex, 838 F3d at 188. The discount fee is the price the merchant pays the
acquiring bank to process the patron's card and to avoid having to extend credit itself. See
note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of capital).
137 See Amex, 838 F3d at 188. The issuing bank pays the interchange fee to the ac-
quiring bank for facilitating the issuer's extension of credit to the patron.
138 It also solves the transaction-cost problem discussed in Part II.A related to mer-
chants extending credit directly. See notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
139 See NaBanco, 779 F2d at 596.
140 See text accompanying notes 47-50.
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NaBanco decision is unique in that it considers evidence of multi-
sidedness, not just to constrain the space of allowable pro- and
anticompetitive trade-offs, but also to establish the need for rule-
of-reason analysis (and market definition) over § 1's per se rule.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the challenged conduct "was not a
naked restraint of competition and therefore not per se price fix-
ing."141 In arriving at this conclusion, it considered the value of
the platform as a "joint enterprise," recognizing its need to man-
age the problem of getting and keeping both cardholders and mer-
chants onboard.142 It reasoned that the interchange fee "accompa-
nies 'the coordination of other productive or distributive efforts of
the parties' that is 'capable of increasing the integration's effi-
ciency and no broader than required for that purpose."'143
Evidence of multisidedness was also instrumental to the
Second Circuit's market definition in United States v American
Express Co14 ("Amex"). The case involved a § 1 Sherman Act alle-
gation and a payment-card platform similar to the one at issue in
Visa.145 In particular, Amex, Visa, and MasterCard put various
provisions-including Amex's nondiscriminatory provisions
(NDPs)-into their contracts with card-accepting merchants, pro-
hibiting them from steering cardholders toward other methods of
payment.146 Plaintiffs alleged that absent the NDPs, "merchants
would be able to use steering 'at the point of sale to foster compe-
tition on price and terms among sellers of network services' by
encouraging customers to use less expensive or otherwise pre-
ferred cards."147 Visa and MasterCard settled; Amex went to trial.
In contrast to its market definition in Visa, the Second Circuit in
Amex held that the district court had erred in declining to "col-
laps[e] the issuance and network services markets into a single
141 NaBanco, 779 F2d at 603.
142 See id at 602.
143 Id, quoting Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fix-
ing and Market Division, 75 Yale L J 373, 474 (1966).
144 838 F3d 179 (2d Cir 2016), cert granted, Ohio v American Express Co, 2017 WL
2444673 (US).
145 See id at 185-86.
146 Id at 191-92. One method of steering involves offering customers discounts or non-
monetary incentives to use another payment method. See id at 184.
147 Id at 192. Amex is known for high cardholder rewards and high merchant discount
fees. Absent contractual prohibitions, merchants have incentives to steer Amex customers
toward paying with another method in order to avoid the fees while still reaping the ben-
efits of selling to Amex's "marquee" cardholders. See id at 188-90 (explaining that Amex's
higher-end customers tend to spend more than other types of cardholders).
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platform-wide market for transactions."148 In applying
Cellophane's interchangeability standard and Grinnell's
commercial-realities framework,149 the court distinguished Visa
by explaining:
The Visa panel thus did not conduct a rule-of-reason analysis
to determine whether vertical restraints were inhibiting com-
petition on one particular side of a two-sided platform. In-
stead, the Visa panel conducted a rule-of-reason analysis to
determine whether horizontal restraints were inhibiting
competition on one particular level of competition contained
within a two-sided platform.150
Conditional on this logic, the relevant product market in Amex
was the entire multisided platform, which the court established
in part by reference to intraplatform feedback effects between
merchants and cardholders. In particular, payment-card plat-
forms must price so as to bring and keep both sides onboard.151
While the outcome appears correct,1 52 were Visa to write sim-
ilar exclusionary contracts today, the court's horizontal-vertical
distinction may be insufficient to produce the same outcome. Un-
derstanding why requires understanding horizontal and vertical
restraints. A horizontal restraint is one "imposed by agreement
between competitors at the same level of distribution. The re-
straint is horizontal not because it has horizontal effects, but be-
cause it is the product of a horizontal agreement."153 A vertical
restraint is one "imposed by agreement between firms at different
levels of distribution."154
The NDPs in Amex are best viewed as vertical restraints with
intended effects on horizontal competition. First, Amex operates
a three-party system, as shown in Figure 2.
148 Amex, 838 F3d at 197.
149 Id at 196-97. See also Part I.B.
150 Amex, 838 F3d at 198.
151 See id at 200 (discussing pricing's impact on onboarding both sides of the platform).
152 See Part III.B.
153 Black's Law Dictionary at 1508 (cited in note 10).
154 Id. The Second Circuit itself embraces similar definitions. See Amex, 838 F3d at
194 ("Restraints imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been de-
nominated as horizontal restraints, and those imposed by agreement between firms at
different levels of distribution as vertical restraints."), quoting Business Electronics Corp
v Sharp Electronics Corp, 485 US 717, 730 (1988).
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Such a system differs from that of Visa and MasterCard (shown
in Figure 1) in that it eliminates the banking layer.155 Second, the
Amex NDPs appeared in a contract between Amex and its mer-
chants.156 Such restraints are vertical.157 They prevented mer-
chants from steering cardholders on the other side of the platform
toward other methods of payment, including those offered by com-
peting platforms.158 These intended effects are thus horizontal.
On Visa's facts, its exclusionary rules were likely horizontal
restraints. This is because Visa and MasterCard were structured
as "open, joint venture associations with members (primarily
banks) that issue payment cards, acquire merchants who accept
payment cards, or both."159 The district court found that the mem-
bers competed with each other on "pricing, fees and finance
155 See Amex, 838 F3d at 188-89 (comparing closed- and open-loop systems). See also
Filistrucchi, et al, 10 J Competition L & Econ at 304-06 (cited in note 97) (discussing four-
and five-party payment systems).
156 See Amex, 838 F3d at 190-91.
157 See Black's Law Dictionary at 1508 (cited in note 10). The conclusion requires that
a vertical chain includes its customer, as the court seems to accept. See Amex, 838 F3d at
197-98.
158 See id at 191-92.
159 United States v Visa U.S.A., Inc, 163 F Supp 2d 322, 332 (SDNY 2001) (explain-
ing that Visa and MasterCard "do not have stock, or shareholders; just members and
membership interests"). See also id at 399, citing Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 US 1, 23-25 (1979) (discussing joint ventures), and
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc v Pacific Stationery & Printing, Co, 472 US 284,
293-98 (1985) (employing rule-of-reason analysis on allegedly exclusive behavior by a
cooperative).
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charges, product features and other services for cardholders and
merchants."160 As such, the Second Circuit found that the restric-
tive provision was "a horizontal restraint adopted by 20,000 com-
petitors."161 In terms of Figure 1, the court determined that the
restraint existed between banks at the issuer-acquirer level and
treated the platform as a mere extension of those banks. The
Amex court then distinguished the cases on this horizontal-
vertical logic.162
However, MasterCard went public in 2006, and Visa followed
suit in 2008.163 Doing away with the membership-based structure
increases the likelihood that similarly situated contracts between
Visa and the issuing banks could be characterized as vertical re-
straints. In part, this is because the absence of shareholders had
supported Visa and MasterCard's characterization as joint ven-
tures.164 In terms of Figure 1, the change in corporate structure
may compel future courts to treat the platform as a stand-alone
entity and determine that similarly situated contracts exist be-
tween the platform firm and an issuing bank, rather than among
banks at the same level.166 Because such contracts would never-
theless impact industry competitors, they would be properly
considered vertical agreements intended to have horizontal ef-
fects on competition. However, Amex's NDPs were likewise ver-
tical restraints with intended horizontal effect. The structural
change thus tends to erode the Second Circuit's horizontal-
vertical distinction.
This erosion is consequential in the following ways. First, be-
cause Visa and Amex were distinguishable on the court's
160 Visa, 163 F Supp 2d at 332-33. Because Amex issues cards directly, it also com-
petes with the issuing banks. See note 155 and accompanying text. See also Figures 1-2.
161 Visa, 344 F3d at 242.
162 See text accompanying notes 149-51.
163 See Katie Benner, Visa's $15 Billion IPO: Feast or Famine? (Fortune, Mar 18,
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/NQX9-N3U2. See also Filistrucchi, et al, 10 J Competi-
tion L & Econ at 305 (cited in note 97) ("As a result of regulatory and competition policy
interventions, payment-card associations transformed themselves into payment-card com-
panies, giving rise to a fifth system participant. Hence, a distinction is often made between
four-party and five-party systems.").
164 See note 159 and accompanying text.
165 Should Visa's and MasterCard's new structures be more form than substance, the
court has recourse to a Copperweld argument. See Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube
Corp, 467 US 752, 773 n 21 (1984) (explaining that "substance, not form, should determine
whether a[n] . . . entity is capable of conspiring under § 1"). When that is the case, the
degree of separation matters. See American Needle, Inc v National Football League, 560
US 183, 195 (2010) ("The key is whether the alleged 'contract, combination .... or con-
spiracy' is concerted action-that is, whether it joins together separate decisionmakers.").
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horizontal-vertical logic at the time of decision, the test in
Part III is not strictly required to reconcile the two cases. How-
ever, it serves as an alternative approach to distinguishing the
cases without recourse to horizontal-vertical logic. In the present
environment, such an approach could be useful in cases in which
directionality is harder to tease out or fails entirely. Second, ad-
vances in economic and statistical methodology have rendered
finer-grained analysis more feasible.166 To the extent that horizon-
tal and vertical labeling stands in as a first-order approximation
of the more nuanced fundamentals of competition in the relevant
market, and to the extent business methods continue to evolve in
complex-and potentially nondirectional or multidirectional
ways-improvements in methodology may render such labeling
less important. When horizontal and vertical distinctions tell an
incomplete tale, the test in Part III permits analysis without re-
course to directionality.
III. TESTING FOR MULTISIDEDNESS DURING MARKET DEFINITION
This Comment presents market definition as a contested
problem of comparative harm and complexity. Because rule-of-
reason analysis allows courts to trade off pro- and anticompetitive
effects within the relevant market,167 defining the relevant mar-
ket is akin to establishing the space of allowable trade-offs.168 This
is why market definition is frequently outcome determinative. To
this, multisidedness adds the challenges of incorporating trans-
action costs and interconnected demand. Predictably, courts have
differed on how to navigate these waters. In particular, defining
the relevant market to include all sides of the platform creates a
broader space of allowable pro- and anticompetitive trade-offs
during rule-of-reason analysis. Because plaintiffs and defendants
often have opposing incentives concerning the applicability of
multisidedness to market definition,169 knowing when to disre-
gard or accept arguments concerning multisidedness is crucial. In
this context, the courts could benefit from a test that seeks to de-
termine when the relevant market should incorporate all sides of
the platform.
166 See notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
167 See Capital Imaging Associates, PC v Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc, 996
F2d 537, 543 (2d Cir 1993).
168 See notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
169 See notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
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Part III.A proposes a two-stage test. In the first stage, a court
should exclude proffered multisidedness when any of the listed
factors do not hold. In the second stage-and conditional on pass-
ing the first-a court should, under particular conditions, define
the relevant market to include all sides of the platform. Part III.B
applies this test to demonstrate an alternate approach to distin-
guishing the Second Circuit's decisions in Visa and Amex.
A. Testing for Multisided Effects
Although recent, multisided platform theory is nevertheless
well studied.17 0 Various parts of the economics literature have pro-
posed guidelines for courts, including lists of factors for the courts
to consider when dealing with multisided platforms.171 This
Comment likewise proposes a list; however, its contribution is to
compile factors-justified both by case law and economic theory-
that serve as a test for when courts should and should not incor-
porate multisidedness in market definition.
There are at least four reasons for developing such a test.
First, courts justifiably can and do consider evidence of multisid-
edness in market definition.1 72 Second, market definition will
likely persist in the foreseeable future. While academics and prac-
titioners have developed measures of anticompetitive behavior
that do not rely on market definition, Supreme Court precedent
continues to endorse analysis of the relevant market for many
types of claims.173 Third, avoiding unjustified inclusion of multi-
sided effects in market definition promotes judicial accuracy.
170 See note 103 and accompanying text (noting the existence of more than two hun-
dred recent articles on the topic).
171 See, for example, Filistrucchi, et al, 10 J Competition L & Econ at 302, 322, 332-
33 (cited in note 97).
172 See Times-Picayune Publishing Co v United States, 345 US 594, 610 (1953) (rec-
ognizing that "every newspaper is a dual trader in separate though interdependent mar-
kets," namely those for subscribers and advertisers). While it went on to consider anticom-
petitive effects under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act on only the advertising side, the Court
did not bar combined analysis and further recognized that "[t]he 'market,' as most concepts
in law or economics, cannot be measured by metes and bounds." Id at 611. Some thirteen
years later, the Grinnell Court, while endorsing Cellophane's interchangeability approach,
went on to hold that there is "no barrier to combining in a single market a number of
different products or services where that combination reflects commercial realities."
Grinnell, 384 US at 572. See also text accompanying notes 62-65.
173 See Grinnell, 384 US at 570-71 (explicitly including the notion of a relevant mar-
ket in the elements of a § 2 Sherman Act claim). See also notes 81-82 and accompanying
text. The collection of measures for determining anticompetitive behavior absent market
definition may be undertheorized: existing measures like the Gross Upward Pricing
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Fourth, clarity serves to decrease meritless and costly market def-
inition. In this sense, an overly inclusive interpretation risks a
slippery slope in which antitrust enforcement lacks teeth against
broadening relevant markets. Likewise, an excessively restrictive
interpretation may benefit parties that are not typically the ob-jects of antitrust law.174
The test proceeds in two stages. In the first, a court asks
(1) whether the business method can explicitly charge different
prices to the distinct groups to which it provides goods or services;
(2) whether each group's benefit depends on the extent of partici-
pation by the other groups provisioned by the same business
method and whether that participation varies based on market
conditions; and (3) whether the platform is capable of, and gener-
ally does, set uniform prices in the markets in which each group
participates. All three factors must hold, or multisidedness
should be excluded from market definition.
Assuming all three stage one factors are satisfied, the court
moves on to the second stage and asks whether the challenged
conduct is designed principally to ensure continued availability of
the platform's differentiated products. If so, the relevant market
should encompass the market segments in which all sides of the
platform operate. 175
Pressure Index tend to be granular. Even as academics and practitioners refine these ap-
proaches, one might expect courts to consider multiple different measures, including tra-
ditional market-definition-based arguments.
174 For example, antitrust harms are comparative, and a narrower relevant market
tends to magnify antitrust impact. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text. Because
demonstrating antitrust injury is required for private standing, judicial thresholds favor-
ing narrower relevant markets may multiply the number and types of plaintiffs who sur-
vive dismissal motions. See notes 18, 32-36 and accompanying text. Adjusting the thresh-
old for all plaintiffs increases the likelihood of successful litigation by competitors within
an industry, even though competitors are not typically the focus of antitrust protection.
See Brunswick, 429 US at 488 ("The antitrust laws [] were enacted for 'the protection of
competition, not competitors."'). The converse is true for judicial thresholds favoring
broader relevant markets.
175 Determining the extent of the relevant market then implicates standard defini-
tional tools like the hypothetical monopolist test. However, "[m]ost standard approaches
to market definition ... do not apply to two-sided markets without modification, occasion-
ally radical in nature." Two-Sided Markets, in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Market Def-
inition in Antitrust: Theory and Case Studies 437, 438 (ABA 2012). Fortunately, econo-
mists have developed multisided versions of both the critical-loss and demand-estimation
methods for determining whether a hypothetical monopolist would likely impose a small
but significant and nontransitory increase in price. See, for example, id at 452-59. After a
court tests for and concludes that multisidedness merits consideration, the analysis shifts
to determining the extent of those relevant market segments on each side of the platform.
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1. Stage one: exclusion.
The first stage aims to exclude proffered multisidedness that
does not satisfy certain conditions. The same task might be ac-
complished by a clean definition of multisidedness-and in many
ways the first stage is a sort of "definition." However, it is im-
portant to distinguish between definitions meant to frame multi-
sidedness conceptually and those suited for use in scoping the rel-
evant market. Because conceptual definitions must introduce
readers to a potentially unfamiliar topic, they involve some level
of curation. For example, consider two popular definitions. Pro-
fessors Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole propose a price-
centric interpretation of multisidedness17e while Professors David
Evans and Richard Schmalensee propose an interpretation cen-
tered on transaction costs and interconnected groups. 177 Although
they differ in focus, these definitions are not contradictory. And
courts appear to cite them for their conceptual-framing value ra-
ther than during market definition itself.178
Any operational definition of multisidedness intended to help
scope the relevant market must be capable of both fine-grained
and flexible application to ex ante fact patterns. This is because
the Kodak Court mandated a fact-intensive inquiry into
consumer-level commercial realities,179 meaning that rule-of-
reason analyses should consider potentially unique business prac-
tices, industry structures, and consumer interactions. Further, in
Times-Picayune Publishing Co v United States180 and Grinnell,
the Court endorsed the consideration of interconnected markets
and submarkets, both of which are germane to multisidedness.181
176 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37
RAND J Econ 645, 664-65 (2006) (explaining that a platform is two sided if it "can affect
the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the [platform] and reducing the
price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in other words, the price structure mat-
ters, and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board").
177 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Catalyst Code: The Strategies behind
the World's Most Dynamic Companies 3 (Harvard Business 2007) (explaining that a multi-
sided platform "has (a) two or more groups of customers; (b) who need each other in some
way; but (c) who can't capture the value from their mutual attraction on their own; and
(d) rely on the [platform] to facilitate value-creating reactions between them").
178 See Amex, 838 F3d at 185 n 3 (discussing Rochet and Tirole's definition in the
background portion of the opinion); US Airways Inc v Sabre Holdings Corp, 2017 WL
1064709, *8 (SDNY) (discussing Rochet and Tirole's definition, as well as Evans and
Schmalensee's definition, prior to starting market-definition analysis).
179 See Kodak, 504 US at 482. See also text accompanying notes 66-67.
180 345 US 594 (1953).
181 See id at 610; Grinnell, 384 US at 572. See also text accompanying notes 62-63.
2090
Testing for Multisided Platform Effects
The factors of an operational definition implicating intercon-
nected markets must be foundational enough to satisfy the fine-
grained flexibility mandate of Kodak, Times-Picayune, and
Grinnell.
Stage one of the test is just such an operational definition.
This Comment argues that the factors best suited to fine-grained
and flexible analysis are the primitives from which applied theo-
rists build industrial organization models of multisidedness.182 In
this context, the term "primitives" refers both to the motivating
problems a multisided platform must solve and the necessary el-
ements of businesses that try to address those problems. The for-
mer pertains to notions of transaction costs and interconnected
demand that motivated economists to develop multisided plat-
form theory in the first place.183 Any test for multisidedness must
incorporate these motivating problems or risk answering the
wrong question entirely.
These primitives are appropriate for constructing a legallyjustified test for four reasons. First, antitrust law is inseparable
from its economic underpinnings, and the courts have long looked
to the industrial organization literature to inform judicial prece-
dent.184 Second, the fact that these primitives are capable of gen-
erating models with distinct predictions about industry behavior
suggests they are also elemental enough to satisfy Kodak's flexi-
bility mandate. Third, although it may be appropriate for concep-
tual definitions of multisidedness to differ in focus, greater com-
monality may be found in the primitives.185 Finally, were courts
to adopt particular conceptual definitions, they could become
182 See generally, for example, Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, Competing Cyber-
mediaries, 45 Eur Econ Rev 797 (2001); Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, Chicken &
Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J Econ 309 (2003);
Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc 990 (cited in note 96); Simon P. Anderson and
Stephen Coate, Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis, 72 Rev Econ Stud
947 (2005); Rochet and Tirole, 37 RAND J Econ 645 (cited in note 176); Mark Armstrong,
Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J Econ 668 (2006); Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev
1642 (cited in note 5).
183 See Part II.A.
184 See, for example, Cellophane, 351 US at 380-81 (citing, without attribution, the
economic concept of cross-elasticity of demand); City of New York v Group Health, Inc, 649
F3d 151, 157 n 2 (2d Cir 2011) (discussing the economic concepts of diversion ratios and
upward pricing pressure).
185 Compare Rochet and Tirole, 37 RAND J Econ at 665 (cited in note 176), with Evans
and Schmalensee, Catalyst Code at 3 (cited in note 177). While the former focuses its def-
inition on prices and transaction volume and the latter concentrates on transaction costs,
each article recognizes the importance of both transaction costs and prices.
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precedential. At best, because any definition necessarily impli-
cates a particular focus, adopting one definition would constrain
a court in cases in which separate fact patterns suggest an alter-
nate focus. At worst, such a limitation runs counter to Kodak's
rule-of-reason principles. In this vein, this Comment treats these
conceptual definitions of multisidedness as helpful signposts in a
movement toward the primitives.
a) Factor one: whether the business method can explicitly
charge different prices to the distinct groups to which it provides
goods or services.18 6 A court should consider evidence of whether
the proffered platform provisions distinct groups on distinct sides
of the platform as well as whether it can charge those groups dif-
ferentially. This is significant as an exclusionary criterion. First,
consider a video game platform that connects gamers with devel-
opers by selling game consoles on one side of the platform and
development kits and licenses on the other.187 Gamers and devel-
opers constitute distinct groups, and the platform's function is to
facilitate their interaction. While both groups purchase products
from the platform (consoles and development licenses), the trans-
action as a whole may also be thought of as having a demand-side
component (gamers) and a supply-side component (developers).
The sides purchase distinct products and thus may be explicitly
186 Apart from the realization that the law's mandate of fine-grained and flexible
analysis is well satisfied by the primitives from which applied theorists build industrial
organization models of multisidedness, another of this Comment's contributions is to spe-
cifically identify those primitives and to translate them into the factors of a permissible
legal test. Arriving at this end involved sifting through applied theory papers for the most
appropriate and widely accepted primitives. Thus, each factor begins with a note explain-
ing which papers support its inclusion. Because theory papers are not known for being
light on mathematical notation, and because much of it is extraneous to the Comment's
inquiry, the explanatory parentheticals in these notes should help interested readers nav-
igate to the variables or parameters that support the factor.
As to this particular factor, see Caillaud and Jullien, 34 RAND J Econ at 311-12 (cited
in note 182) (assuming two separate groups-which the paper denotes as i E {1,2}--whose
interaction is facilitated by two matchmakers-k E {I, E}-and who pay prices p, and p,);
Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc at 995 (cited in note 96) (defining a benchmark with
distinct groups of end users B and S, whose transactions are mediated, and who may be
charged explicitly different prices pB and ps); Rochet and Tirole, 37 RAND J Econ at 652
(cited in note 176) (defining a model with distinct user groups i E {B, S}, who interact indi-
rectly, and who pay a membership fee A' and a usage fee a' that vary based on group
affiliation); Armstrong, 37 RAND J Econ at 671-72 (cited in note 182) (assuming groups 1
and 2, who pay prices p, and P2 through the mechanism). See also Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev
at 1644 (cited in note 5).
187 See, for example, Rysman, 23 J Econ Persp at 125, 129-31 (cited in note 4); Lapo
Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin, and Eric van Damme, Identifying Two-Sided Markets, 36
World Competition 33, 37 (2013).
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charged different prices. Newspapers similarly connect subscrib-
ers and marketers by selling news content on one side of the plat-
form and advertising space on the other.188 This transaction, too,
may be thought of as having a demand side and a supply side
(advertisers that desire viewer impressions and readers who tol-
erate the ads in order to access content). The ability to recharac-
terize the transaction as one of demand and supply sides, how-
ever, is not essential. Consider an online dating platform that
seeks to pair women and men.189 The groups may, though need
not be, charged different prices. Second, it helps to see an example
of groups that are not distinct. Take the example of a firm that
sells a chat application without advertising. Its goal is simply to
maximize profits without regard to any particular composition of
the usership. While the users may happen to be quite diverse, this
is beside the point. The firm's business method does not center on
facilitating interactions in which the defining feature is that the
users belong to meaningfully separate groups.
b) Factor two: whether each group's benefit depends on the
extent of participation by the other groups provisioned by the same
business method and whether that participation varies based on
market conditions.190 A court should consider evidence of cross-
network effects that increase each group's benefits as participa-
tion by the other groups increases. 191 This factor is significant as
an exclusionary criterion. First, it rejects multisidedness for a
firm in the absence of cross-group network effects. For example,
cardholders benefit from widespread acceptance by merchants,
188 See, for example, Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev at 1642-43 (cited in note 5).
189 Perhaps one might say that each group demands the other and supplies itself.
190 See Caillaud and Jullien, 34 RAND J Econ at 313 (cited in note 182) (describing
one group's utility in terms of the number of participants from the opposite group, and
characterizing the number of participants as varying with market prices); Rochet and
Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc at 995 (cited in note 96) (explaining that the surplus for a
member of one group is net surplus multiplied by the extent of participation in the other
group and that the extent of participation varies based on prices); Rochet and Tirole, 37
RAND J Econ at 653 (cited in note 176) (detailing that the utility for one group depends
on the number of participating members on the other side and that the number of partic-
ipants depends on prices); Armstrong, 37 RAND J Econ at 671-72 (cited in note 182)
(same). See also Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev at 1644 (cited in note 5).
191 See, for example, Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev at 1646 (cited in note 5). See also notes
96-98 and accompanying text (explaining that each group cares about the size and attrib-
utes of other groups on the same platform).
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and merchants value widespread diffusion of cards among con-
sumers.19 2 Developers value game consoles that have more gam-
ers, and gainers value consoles with more games.1 98 Of note, the
presence of within-group network effects alone is insufficient to
justify multisidedness absent the presence of cross-group network
effects. For example, if users' benefits of participating in a chat
application increase uniquely as a function of the number of other
users of the same type, then a within-group network effect exists.
This factor does not bar the presence of such effects; it merely re-
quires the presence of cross-network effects. As discussed,
payment-card platforms display cross-network effects between
cardholders and merchants,194 but if merchants also happened to
benefit more when more merchants used the platform, this would
be a permissible-but unnecessary-within-group effect.195 Sec-
ond, this factor rejects multisidedness when the extent of user
participation on both sides does not vary with market conditions.
Such invariance is a poor fit for a notion of multisidedness that
requires user groups to adjust to price changes and changes in the
extent of other groups' participation.196 Third, this factor rejects
multisidedness for a multiproduct firm when the argument for
multisidedness is based solely on product complementarity. For
example, the buyer of complementary products, such as a phone
and a drop-resistant case, internalizes the costs and benefits of
each in deciding to purchase both.197 This does not occur for mul-
tisided platforms, in which distinct user groups fail to internalize
cross-network externalities absent the platform. Fourth, this fac-
tor rejects multisidedness when user groups can reach an efficient
outcome through bargaining. In other words, Professor Ronald
192 See notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
193 See Filistrucchi, Geradin, and van Damme, 36 World Competition at 37 (cited in
note 187).
194 See notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
195 When these are the only network effects present, they are better treated by stand-
ard, one-sided network models. See, for example, Julian Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-
Sided Markets, 3 Rev Network Econ 44, 46 & n 2 (2004).
196 See Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev at 1644 (cited in note 5) (discussing vertical monop-
oly). For example, if dialysis machines provide life-sustaining treatment, patients may
exhibit highly inelastic demand. Their participation does not derive from the extent of
another group's participation, but instead from a medical necessity.
197 See Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc at 991 (cited in note 96).
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Coase's theorem9s must give way as a necessary condition to multi-
sidedness.199 This simply recognizes the fact that a multisided
platform solves a transaction-cost problem or risks answering the
wrong question.200
c) Factor three: whether the platform is capable of, and gen-
erally does, set uniform prices in the markets in which each group
participates.201 A court should consider evidence of whether the
platform has market power and reject multisidedness for a firm
lacking at least some degree of market power on each side of the
platform. Absent this ability to influence prices on each side, the
firm is a mere price taker: it lacks the power to adjust and coordi-
nate the interrelated prices needed to get and keep all sides
onboard.202 In this situation, the firm is better modeled as a dis-
tributor.203 Two points are germane. First, this factor focuses on
whether the firm possesses the minimal degree of market power
needed to coordinate across-group prices. For the court, this is a
narrower inquiry than quantifying the anticompetitive implica-
tions of the improper acquisition of or abuse of market power,
which is a broader purpose of antitrust law.204 Second, this factor
does not require a firm to set perfectly uniform prices on each side
of the platform. While models of market power generally assume
198 In the presence of tradable property rights and the absence of transaction costs,
parties can bargain to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of rights. See
generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
199 See Evans and Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Busi-
nesses at 409 n 9 (cited in note 83) ("[A] necessary condition for a firm to be a multisided
platform is that the Coase [ ] Theorem . .. does not apply."). It is not, however, a sufficient
condition. See Rochet and Tirole, 37 RAND J Econ at 649-50 (cited in note 176) (exploring
a particular sequential bargaining game).
200 See notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
201 See Caillaud and Jullien, 34 RAND J Econ at 313 (cited in note 182) (assuming
the matchmakers set prices for each side simultaneously); Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ
Assoc at 996 (cited in note 96) (assuming the ability to choose uniform prices pB and p' on
each side of the market); Rochet and Tirole, 37 RAND J Econ at 654 (cited in note 176)
(assuming the ability to choose a uniform price structure based on each side of the market);
Armstrong, 37 RAND J Econ at 672 (cited in note 182) (same). See also Weyl, 100 Am Econ
Rev at 1644 (cited in note 5).
202 See notes 101-02 and accompanying text. For example, a payment-card platform
might attract cardholders by offering rewards, which are negative prices, while charging
merchants positive prices.
203 Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev at 1644 (cited in note 5).
204 The court would proceed using its standard toolkit for diagnosing market power;
however, it need not further assess anticompetitive impact at this point. See note 75 and
accompanying text.
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the infeasibility of within-group price discrimination, such a prac-
tice need not stand as an absolute bar to the consideration of
multisidedness .205
2. Stage two: inclusion.
Should any of the stage one factors fail to hold, multisided-
ness should be excluded from market definition. However, condi-
tional on the presence of all first-stage factors, a court should ask
whether the challenged conduct is designed principally to ensure
continued availability of the platform's differentiated products.206
If so, the relevant market should encompass the market segments
in which all sides of the platform operate.
This factor serves as an inclusionary criterion to recognize
conduct necessary to preserving the benefits of the platform.
First, multisidedness is important during market definition when
the challenged conduct prevents distinct user groups from free
riding-that is, obtaining platform benefits without paying for
them. This is often possible when the platform has difficulty mon-
itoring each user group's compliance with its terms, either be-
cause doing so is costly or impractical. For example, say a job-
matching service provided r6sum6 review services to employers
and advocacy services to prospective employees. Benefits from the
platform's solution to their matching problem in hand, wide-
spread ability of the user groups to avoid compensating the plat-
form would represent a threat to continued availability of the
platform's products.07 The platform might avoid the problem by
205 See Weyl, 100 Am Econ Rev at 1645 (cited in note 5).
206 See National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 101 (1984) ("[Tlhis case involves an industry in which horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all."); Broadcast
Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 US 1, 23 (1979) ("Joint ventures and
other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing
schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all.").
207 Market definition focuses on protecting "competition, not competitors." Brown
Shoe, 370 US at 320. Further, the "test of a competitive market is not only whether small
competitors flourish but also whether consumers are well served." United States v
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 US 321, 367 n 43 (1963). See also Standard Oil Co v
United States, 221 US 1, 50-51 (1911) (discussing the Sherman Act's protective common-
law foundations). While Supreme Court language indicates a consumer protection func-
tion, it does little to address interesting normative questions about the distribution of eco-
nomic surplus. Regardless, consumers are not well served by the elimination of platforms
that solve problems of transaction costs and interconnected demand.
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charging employers an up-front membership fee calibrated to rep-
resent the return it would have earned had it elected to bill firms
after successfully delivering matches.
Second, this factor accepts multisidedness when the chal-
lenged conduct prevents arbitrage.208 The ability of any user group
to resell the platform's product in a secondary market would un-
dermine the platform's ability to coordinate prices across user
groups, threatening its continued existence. For example, if a
gaming platform operated a price strategy that sold consoles to
gainers for relatively inexpensive prices and those users were able
to turn around and resell their discounted consoles at higher
prices to developers across the platform (say, if developers also
required consoles but had to pay more for them), then this would
undermine the platform's ability to coordinate prices. Likewise, if
gamers were able to purchase unlicensed imitation games, then
developers would have little incentive to participate in the platform.
B. Application of the Multisidedness Test to Distinguish Visa
and Amex
Although Visa and Amex both involved payment-card sys-
tems, the Second Circuit determined that network services and
card issuance were "two interrelated, but separate, product mar-
kets" in Visa209 but held that the district court erred by failing to
"collaps[e] the issuance and network services markets into a sin-
gle platform-wide market for transactions" in Amex.210 Part II.B.3
made the point that distinguishing cases on horizontal-vertical
logic poses certain challenges.211 This Section explores the two
cases through the lens of Part III.A's proposed multisidedness
test.
Applying the first stage to Visa and Amex fails to exclude
multisidedness from consideration during market definition in ei-
ther case. The first factor asks whether the business method can
explicitly charge different prices to the distinct groups to which it
provides goods or services. The business methods in the two cases
208 See Black's Law Dictionary at 124 (cited in note 10) (defining arbitrage as "[t]he
process of buying something . . . and selling it immediately elsewhere in order to profit
from the difference in prices").
209 Visa, 344 F3d at 238. The court went on to define the relevant product market as
that for network services only. See id at 239-40.
210 Amex, 838 F3d at 197.
211 See text accompanying note 166 (observing that directionality is periodically hard
to make out and that technological advancements that make case-by-case analysis more
feasible may render appeals to directionality less desirable).
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targeted both cardholders and merchants, which are distinct user
groups. While not strictly required, the payment systems supplied
distinct products to each group: merchants required the authori-
zation, settlement, and clearance of transactions inherent in the
network services product, while cardholders required issuance.
Importantly, merchants paid a positive price in the form of a dis-
count fee while consumers paid a reduced-or even negative-
price by receiving rewards. Thus the first factor does not exclude
multisidedness.
The second factor asks whether each group's benefit depends
on the extent of participation by the other groups provisioned by
the same business method and whether that participation varies
based on market conditions. Cardholders benefited from in-
creased acceptance by the merchants they patronized, and mer-
chants benefited from increased card diffusion among patrons,
which means that cross-group network effects were present.212
One would expect that participation varied based on prices and
other market conditions (for example, the extent of the rewards
offered), and the presence of transaction costs precluded side bar-
gains.213 Thus the second factor does not exclude multisidedness.
The third factor asks whether the platform is capable of, and
generally does, set uniform prices in the markets in which each
group participates. As evidenced by their ability to set the inter-
change fee, which had implications for both the merchant dis-
count fee and consumer-card price structure, the firms possessed
sufficient market power to set prices for each user group and thus
to coordinate prices across both sides. Therefore, the third factor
does not exclude multisidedness.
Because all first-stage factors hold, the court would proceed
to the second stage and ask whether the challenged conduct was
designed principally to ensure continued availability of the plat-
form's differentiated products. Recall that in Amex, the chal-
lenged conduct involved antisteering provisions put in place by
Amex, Visa, and MasterCard, which prevented merchants from
steering cardholders toward other methods of payment.214 Steer-
ing is lucrative from the merchant's perspective because it ena-
bles the merchant to minimize the merchant discount fees associ-
ated with consumer card usage. 215 In particular, the antisteering
212 See notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
213 See notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
214 See Part I.B.3.
215 See note 147 and accompanying text.
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provisions prohibited merchants from providing Amex's
cardholders with point-of-sale incentives to use another method
of payment. 216 One can say that widespread steering would have
posed a threat to the continued availability of Amex's differenti-
ated products. As explained below, this is because the value of
Visa and MasterCard as differentiated products comes primarily
from their position as counterpoints to Amex's high-reward, high-
merchant-fee products. The following hypothetical illustrates
this issue.
Assume a single department store patron owns three pay-
ment cards and is contemplating a $100 purchase. Card A
charges merchants a 3.5 percent discount fee per transaction,
which reduces the merchant's revenue by $3.50 to $96.50.217
Cards B and C charge merchants 2.5 percent and 2 percent per
transaction, respectively. A merchant benefits by accepting all
three cards because this increases its ability to attract customers
who will, in turn, increase gross revenue. In particular, Card A
offers high rewards, and its users enjoy this benefit. If the mer-
chant operates in a competitive market, accepting Card A is an
important step toward getting these patrons in the front door.
Now assume merchants can steer patrons in keeping with the
merchants' own incentives.218 When a patron attempts to make
the $100 purchase with Card A, the merchant faces a $3.50 fee.
If, at the point of sale, it were able to persuade the patron to use
Card B instead, the merchant could benefit from Card A's patron
base while saving itself the difference between the 3.5 percent and
the 2.5 percent fees, namely $1.219 However, the patron may not
be willing to use Card B voluntarily: Card A's high merchant dis-
count fee likely finances superior customer rewards. Say the pa-
tron values these rewards at $0.80. With an eye toward maximiz-
ing short-run profits, the merchant could propose the following
trade: in exchange for the patron using Card B, the merchant
would rebate the patron some award valued at between $0.81 and
$0.99. In this way, both the patron and the merchant benefit.220
216 See Amex, 838 F3d at 191-92.
217 Card A represents Amex, known for its affluent cardholders from its original
travel and entertainment business. See id at 187-89.
218 This was the district court's holding in United States v American Express, 88 F
Supp 3d 143, 151-52 (EDNY 2015), which the Second Circuit reversed in Amex.
219 This is a version of the free-rider problem.
220 Amex's antisteering provisions sought to bar this practice specifically. See Amex,
838 F3d at 191.
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The gains to trade experienced by the merchant and the pa-
tron have a clear loser: Card A. In a world in which merchants
are allowed to steer at the point of sale, the fraction of consumers
using Card A declines.221 Eventually, Card A faces one of two
choices: (1) it could reduce its 3.5 percent fee in order to compete
at the point of sale with Card B, or (2) it could discontinue opera-
tions. If there are no productive efficiencies to be gained, reducing
the 3.5 percent fee must come from reducing rewards to Card A
cardholders or charging them a higher fee. If Card A cuts back on
rewards to its cardholders, the merchant can simply change the
terms of its proffered trade with the patron until Card A either
charges a 2.5 percent fee or drops out of the market. However,
even if Card A stays in the market, Card C has a 2 percent fee,
while Cards A and B now charge 2.5 percent. The problem is iter-
ative, and one might expect all three cards to converge at a
similar fee.222
The long-run effect of point-of-sale steering, then, is to either
decrease the number of competitors in the market or decrease the
differentiation among competitors. Decreasing either product dif-
ferentiation or the quantity of competitors runs counter to the
goals of antitrust enforcement.223 The antisteering provisions
might thus be viewed as combating three undesirable situations:
(1) all competitors dropping out of the market and a return to the
historical transaction-cost problem;224 (2) all competitors but one
dropping out of the market, resulting in a pure monopoly; and
(3) some number of competitors remaining in the market, but
with scarcely differentiated products. For Cards A and B, then,
antisteering provisions would plausibly ensure continued availa-
bility of the platforms' differentiated products, thus clearing
stage two's hurdle.
The hypothetical helps shed light on why, in Amex, Visa and
MasterCard may have settled out of court while Amex did not:
antisteering provisions in Visa's and MasterCard's hands would
221 If classical rationality holds, then no Card A transactions occur; however, the hy-
pothetical does not require this assumption.
222 The lower bound for such a fee depends on the level of the interchange fee the
merchant's bank must pay the cardholder's bank. In order to recoup the interchange fee,
the merchant's bank must charge a discount fee of at least the size of the interchange fee.
See Filistrucchi, et al, 10 J Competition L & Econ at 304-05 (cited in note 97).
223 In this case, product differentiation relates to different reward schemes that ap-
peal to various customer bases.
224 See notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing the opportunity cost to mer-
chants of extending open-book credit and the time costs associated with traveler's checks).
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likely not be platform preserving.225 This is because, in reality,
Visa and MasterCard are similar enough in features and fees to
both play the role of Card C. As the low-feature, low-price
counterpoints to Amex's high-reward, high-merchant-fee product,
they would likely have been the beneficiaries of merchants' steer-
ing behavior. The hypothetical also helps explain why the Second
Circuit was correct in accepting multisidedness as part of market
definition in Amex and excluding it in Visa. As to Amex, Card A
represents Amex, and it had recourse to the preservation argu-
ment discussed above. As to Visa, recall that Visa's and
MasterCard's platforms include a layer of intermediary banks
and that the challenged conduct in Visa implicated exclusivity
rules prohibiting these banks from issuing Amex and Discover
cards.226 These rules did not seek to preserve product differentia-
tion over time. Merchants had not attempted to free ride on ben-
efits while skirting burdens. No one attempted to arbitrage the
platform's market. Visa's and MasterCard's rules merely sought
to exclude Amex from competing for certain customers. Turf bat-
tles of this sort constitute plain old exclusive behavior.
CONCLUSION
Whether a court should incorporate one or more sides of a
multisided platform during antitrust market definition is a
thorny matter. Definitions that include all sides of the platform
create a broader space of allowable pro- and anticompetitive
trade-offs than definitions that include fewer sides. Because the
result of this inquiry often dictates the outcome of the case, plain-
tiffs and defendants have incentives to propose markedly differ-
ent definitions. Courts, in turn, have varied on whether and how
to incorporate evidence of multisidedness in the definitional pro-
cess. Yet the challenge posed by multisided platforms may be ad-
dressed methodologically, and this Comment suggests one ap-
proach. Its contribution is the development of a test designed to
help courts know when to disregard or accept arguments concern-
ing the applicability of multisidedness to market definition.
Because antitrust operates at the juncture of case law and eco-
nomics, any would-be test must be faithful to both. This Comment
225 Point-of-sale steering would tend to harm above-average reward products rather
than low-feature, low-cost products.
226 See text accompanying notes 113, 136-37.
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argues that the test factors best suited to the fine-grained and flex-
ible analysis mandated by Kodak, Times-Picayune, and Grinnell
are the primitives from which applied theorists build industrial
organization models of multisidedness. This Comment identifies
these factors and adapts them for judicial usage. Of note, the test
proposed herein provides an alternative to definitional character-
izations based on the horizontal or vertical nature of the chal-
lenged restraint. When these directional distinctions tell an in-
complete tale, the Comment's test permits analysis of
multisidedness without recourse to directionality. This is all the
more important in an environment in which advances in economic
and statistical methodology permit finer-grained analysis and
novel business methods challenge traditional notions of industrial
organization.
